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Abstract 
We define self-enhancement and self-protection as interests that individuals have 
in advancing one or more self-domains or defending against negative self-views. We 
review ways in which people pursue self-enhancement and self-protection, discuss the 
role of these motivational constructs in scientific explanations, argue for their importance 
in maintaining psychological and physical well-being, and consider the conditions in 
which they are likely to operate. At various points, we address the perennial “cognition-
motivation” debate. We argue that, despite the conceptual and practical difficulties that 
attend this distinction, the pervasiveness of the self-enhancement and self-protection 
motives makes it impossible and imprudent to ignore them in explaining self-related 
findings and theories.  
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Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection: 
What They Are and What They Do 
  People pursue pleasurable experiences and avoid unpleasant ones. This tenet 
comes in many flavours, including the law of effect, unconditioned reinforcement, the 
pleasure principle, biological readiness, minimization-mobilization, and minmax decision 
strategies. Whichever terminology one prefers, it is psychology’s most fundamental and 
immutable behavioural law that people seek to maximize their positive experiences and 
minimize their negative ones.  
  This hedonism principle lies at the heart of motivational psychology. Throughout 
its history, culminating in the behavioural psychology that ruled the roost in the 1950s, 
psychologists have theorized about the conditions that instigate, maintain and energize 
behaviour. Motivational constructs are intervening variables (Reeve, 1997) designed to 
account for the fact that, with the same stimulus conditions, even animals low on the 
(increasingly controversial) phylogenetic scale can behave differently. The issue of 
response variability in the face of identical environmental conditions reaches its apex in 
accounting for the behaviour of humans, which is driven by diverse motives such as the 
needs for achievement (Atkinson & Raynor, 1974), social approval (Marlowe & Crowne, 
1961), and stimulation (Sales, 1971). 
The focus of this article is on a particular brand of motivated behaviour, namely, 
the tendency for people to exaggerate their virtues and to minimize their shortcomings, as 
well as to construe or remember events in a way that places their attributes in the most 
favourable light that is credible to oneself and others (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; 
Sedikides & Gregg, 2003, 2008). We refer to these motives as self-enhancement and self-
protection. Although many non-motivational factors contribute to the tendency to view 
oneself more positively, or less negatively, than objective circumstances warrant, we 
concentrate on the purposive strategies that people pursue to explain or remember their 
decisions, actions, and characteristics in a way that maintains or advances their desired 
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self-views.  
Despite the ubiquity of the self-enhancement and self-protection constructs, these 
terms have been treated loosely in the literature. Although demonstrations of self-
enhancement and self-protection abound, it is unclear what the various behaviours and 
judgements that reflect these motives have in common, what they aim to accomplish, 
how and when they are deployed, and how they influence identity, psychological or 
physical health, as well as social relations. In this article, we define self-enhancement and 
self-protection as interests that people have in advancing one or more self-components or 
defending themselves against negative self-views. We explore the ways in which people 
pursue self-enhancement and self-protection, discuss the role of these motivational 
constructs in scientific explanations, argue for their importance, and consider their scope 
and functionality. At various points, we weigh in on the perennial “cognition-motivation” 
debate. We argue that, despite the practical difficulties that attend this distinction and 
notwithstanding some of the unfortunate ways in which it has been construed, the 
prevalence and importance of motivational phenomena makes it impossible and 
imprudent to legislate the distinction out of existence and to underestimate the role of 
self-enhancement and self-protection.  
We begin with a short introduction to the emergence of self-enhancement and 
self-protection themes in social psychology. We then describe self-enhancement and self-
protection as instrumental in maintaining, promoting, or safeguarding pivotal interests, 
and consider the relation between these interests and the ways in which they are 
regulated. We next discuss the relation between self-enhancement and self-protection, 
and examine their standing as scientific constructs. We conclude by considering the 
relevance of self-enhancement and self-protection to psychological theories.  
  A Brief History of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Motives in Social Psychology 
The Emergence 
Motivational constructs hearken back to social psychology’s inception, beginning 
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with Triplett’s (1897) groundbreaking study, which demonstrated the motivational 
advantages of riding bicycles in the presence of other people as opposed to solitary time 
trials. Although the importance of self-enhancement and self-protection motives was 
widely recognized—by William James (1890), for example, in his discussion of “self-
seeking” which promoted vanity and pride, and later by Gordon Allport’s (1937) in his 
view of ego-protection as “nature’s eldest law”—the empirical study of these motives 
awaited a greater emphasis on theory development in social psychology.  
The impetus for such theory was provided by Kurt Lewin and his students at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology following the Second World War. Lewin’s field 
theory (1935, 1936), from which many prominent social-psychological research 
programs derived, was avowedly dynamic in nature. Lewin’s example was the forerunner 
of influential motivational formulations such as Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory 
(1957) and Heider’s (1958) balance theory. In the late 1950s, the needs to maintain 
cognitive consistency or balance were the foundation for the central motivational theories 
in social psychology. 
By the late 1960s, dynamic motivational explanations, primarily in the guise of 
cognitive dissonance theory, were so ingrained in social psychology that they were 
virtually unchallenged. Cognitive dissonance theory assumed that post-decisional attitude 
change reduced the cognitive tension that attitude-discrepant behaviour evoked. The first 
volley in what came to be known as the “cognition-motivation” debate was fired by Bem 
(1967) in his self-perception reinterpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Bem 
argued that people evaluate their internal states (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, traits, intentions) 
by reviewing their behaviour and the reinforcement conditions that control their actions. 
When the incentives for behaviour are insufficient to explain it, people assume that it 
must have issued from a positive attitude or intention. Thus, when a participant in a 
cognitive dissonance experiment performs a behaviour for a paltry reward, the participant 
assumes that he or she endorses the behaviour. No motivational assumptions about the 
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need to reduce cognitive tension are required.  
  After almost four decades of relevant research, it is fair to assert that the 
motivational assumptions of cognitive dissonance theory have been vindicated (Aronson, 
1992; Cooper, 2007; Elliot & Devine, 1994). For its part, self-perception theory (Bem, 
1972) became an integral component of the burgeoning attributional movement of the 
1960s and 1970s. Bem’s non-motivational perspective was consistent with earlier and 
later formulations which modeled social perception on a “person as scientist” metaphor 
(Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). The aptness of this metaphor was soon questioned, 
however, when initial tests of Kelley’s attributional model by McArthur (1972) showed 
that people deviated substantially from the model’s normative expectations, especially in 
their neglect of consensus information. More importantly, the dozens of studies that 
Weiner’s (1972) attributional analysis of achievement motivation inspired revealed a 
tendency for actors to attribute their successful outcomes to internal factors such as 
ability and effort, and their unsuccessful outcomes to external factors such as bad luck 
and task difficulty. Despite thorny conceptual problems (e.g., ability, effort, task 
difficulty, and luck are neither independent nor easily classified as “internal” or 
“external”), as well as mixed empirical findings (Zuckerman, 1979), this research 
program, referred to as “attributional egotism” or the “self-serving bias,” became the first 
major installment of self-enhancement/self-protection theories in social psychology. 
The Counterpoint 
  But no sooner was attributional egotism introduced than it was subjected to a full-
frontal assault by Miller and Ross (1975). These authors proposed various non-
motivational explanations for the self-serving bias, the most compelling being that people 
expect success more frequently than failure and make internal attributions for expected 
outcomes. Although this view was immediately challenged (Weary Bradley, 1978; 
Weary, 1979), and the weight of the subsequent evidence strongly supported a 
motivational interpretation of the self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; 
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Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Roese & Olson, 2007; Sedikides, Campbell, 
Elliot, & Reeder, 2002), expectancies provide an alternative to several self-enhancement 
and self-protection phenomena. We will return to the role of expectancies in self-
enhancement and self-protection motives in subsequent sections. 
  Motivational constructs were briefly submerged with the ascendance of social 
cognition as the dominant perspective in social psychology in the late 1970s. The initial 
wave of social cognition research emphasized person memory. Many of the early studies 
in this area were based on associative network models and computer metaphors, and 
made no reference to goal-directed behaviour of any sort, whether motivational or non-
motivational (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002). Given the prevalence 
of motivational assumptions and explanations throughout social psychology’s history, it 
was only a matter of time until motivational processes insinuated their way back into the 
fold. Social cognition researchers began to distinguish between “cold” and “hot” 
cognitive processes, the latter referring to thoughts and judgements that were influenced 
by “affect.” Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, the interplay between affective and 
cognitive responses has been one of the most researched topics in the whole social 
cognition enterprise (Forgas, 2001, 2006; Sedikides, 1995). 
A Resolution 
  Miller and Ross’s (1975) landmark analysis of the self-serving bias, including 
their non-motivational interpretations of these effects, ignited a wave of attempts to 
reestablish motivational explanations on a more solid footing. As we noted above, these 
efforts were largely successful, but only after extensive evidence was amassed and 
considerable controversy had ensued. Frustration with distinguishing between 
motivational and non-motivational explanations led to questioning whether it was even 
possible to make this distinction effectively (Tetlock & Levi, 1982). 
  Insightful and influential articles on lay epistemology (Kruglanski, 1989) and on 
the interplay between motivational biases and cognitive processes (Kunda,1990; 
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Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), showed how motivational and non-motivational 
processes could coexist in explaining various psychological phenomena and helped to 
overcome the tendency to treat cognitive and motivational processes as mutually 
exclusive. These articles elucidated motivated biases of various types by describing the 
cognitive processes by which they exerted their influence, and made clear that complete 
explanations of social behaviour required both of these elements.  
In short, self-enhancement and self-protection motives are so fundamental to the 
way researchers view identity and social relations that it was, and is, virtually impossible 
to dispense with explanations that incorporate these motives. In fact, such explanations 
have waxed rather than waned since the days of the self-serving bias controversies. 
Although the caricatures that once prevailed of people as either coldly rational 
information processors or self-aggrandizing fools have been laid to rest, conceptual 
confusion about the meaning of self-enhancement and self-protection motives, and their 
proper sphere of explanation, abounds. Our goal is to provide a framework for these 
motives that will help to elucidate their meaning and highlight areas in which further 
empirical clarification is needed. 
Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Regulating Interests 
Primary and Secondary Control 
We preface our analysis of self-enhancement and self-protection with reference to 
the distinction between primary and secondary control (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 
1982). Primary control refers to changing an objective state of affairs by taking effective 
or instrumental action, whereas secondary control substitutes psychological mechanisms 
that control events by altering how one perceives or interprets them. Self-enhancement 
and self-protection are straightforward and non-controversial when considered from the 
standpoint of primary control. In this capacity, self-enhancement entails instrumental 
action designed to promote oneself and one’s prospects, whereas successful self-
protective measures obviate falling below one’s standards. 
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It is with regard to secondary control that issues become more exciting and 
contentious. When people cannot promote themselves objectively, they have recourse to 
construal mechanisms such as reinterpreting the meaning of social or task feedback, 
misremembering or reconstructing events in a self-serving way, and making excuses for 
poor behaviour or performance. Primary and secondary control efforts are often related, 
such as when a person relies on the amount of effort he has exerted toward a goal 
(primary control) as a means to exaggerate how close he has come to accomplishing it 
(secondary control). We concentrate in this article primarily on such secondary control 
processes, although we contrast secondary with primary control at various junctures.  
Psychological Needs as Interests 
  Our analysis of self-enhancement and self-protection relies on the concept of 
interests as they have been discussed in jurisprudence (Feinberg, 1984) and social and 
political philosophy (Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971). Whereas the law is perforce concerned 
with ways in which interests can be harmed, we extend the analysis of interests to include 
benefits (i.e., ways in which interests can be advanced) as well as harms (i.e., ways in 
which interests can be regressed or thwarted). We focus exclusively on psychological 
interests to explicate the varieties and complexities of self-enhancement and self-
protection strivings. 
  Psychological interests include security/love, social status, and popularity, as well 
as the possession of high skill levels and capacities (e.g., intelligence, athleticism, 
musicality). To say that people have interests is to assume that they will exert primary or 
secondary control to advance or protect them. A person with an interest in being popular, 
for example, will either work to increase her or his popularity (primary control) or engage 
in mental machinations such as misperceiving or misremembering events, or construing 
comparisons with other people, in a way that achieves the same goal (secondary control). 
We assume that people resort to secondary control when primary control efforts fail, 
when they lack confidence that such efforts will succeed, or when such efforts are too 
 
This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection  10 
onerous to sustain. 
Interests can be relatively specific (e.g., to perform well on a test) or general (e.g., 
to be a good student). Interests entail purely private concerns (e.g., to meet one’s personal 
standards) as well as concerns with public perceptions. Interests also extend to close 
others and to ingroups, whose life circumstances or outcomes influence one’s 
psychological or physical health. Finally, interests can be either positive or negative. The 
former include things that people wish to possess or attain (corresponding to approach 
motives), whereas the latter include things that people wish to circumvent or shun 
(corresponding to avoidance motives). The same interest can be cast in either a positive 
frame (e.g., a desire to be viewed as assertive) or a negative frame (e.g., a desire to avoid 
being seen as unassertive).  
Hierarchical Network of Interests 
Interests can be classified in terms of five levels. Each level from the bottom-up 
represents an increasing degree of abstraction or generality. Global self-esteem resides at 
the top of the hierarchy: All self-enhancement and self-protection processes are geared 
toward maintaining the most favourable conception of self and positive affect that reality 
constraints will comfortably allow.  
The next highest level includes such interests as security/love, social status, 
power/effectance, and psychological or physical health. These are “ulterior” interests that 
virtually all people share to some degree. Thus, global self-esteem, and ulterior interests, 
are relevant to virtually all experiences that bear on the well-being of the self. 
The mid level features such interests as to be popular, respected, affluent, possess 
high skill levels, and have successful relationships. These subordinate interests are 
activated in specific domains of experience. An interest in being popular is evoked, for 
example, in social situations, whereas an interest in financial gain is activated in 
situations that are relevant to wealth accumulation. The lower level entails event-specific 
interests. These subserve one or more superordinate interests and are aroused by 
 
This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection  11 
individual events or experiences. Criticism from a friend, for example, is relevant to 
immediate interests such as to avoid a misunderstanding or to resolve a dispute. 
Explaining oneself to the friend may serve higher-order interests such as to maintain 
one’s relationships and reputation, which in turn serves the ulterior interest of 
psychological health. 
Interests comprise a hierarchical network. For example, a low-level interest (e.g., 
to perform well on a class presentation) might subserve higher-level interests (e.g., to 
impress a dating partner, to be competitive for a PhD application, to please one’s 
parents). Figure 1 depicts a hypothetical network of interests. Interest networks are 
connected both horizontally and vertically. At the lowest level of the vertical hierarchy 
are specific behavioural events or outcomes such as receiving praise from a colleague, 
purchasing a new car, or obtaining a salary increase. These are the ordinary or everyday 
concerns about which people spend most of their time thinking and toward which they 
direct primary control efforts. In the example of Figure 1, the behavioural event is a 
person fired from his job.  
The first level of abstraction in this example pertains to interests in self-views, 
only some of which are relevant to the event of being fired. The man’s perception of 
himself as a good spouse and a successful stockbroker are both affected by the loss of his 
job, whereas his views of himself as a good parent and a competent guitar player are 
unaffected. At the next level, both his interest in maintaining successful relationships and 
in being financially secure are threatened. In this example, each of his ulterior interests 
(security, social status, effectance, and physical health) is influenced by the loss of his 
job. 
  Vertical and horizontal connections can be either facilitative or inhibitory. In the 
case of a facilitative connection, an event that serves one interest simultaneously benefits 
another, such as when the receipt of a prestigious award serves the interests of public 
recognition and financial gain. Facilitative connections among interests aid self-
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enhancement by conferring benefits in multiple self-concept domains. Inhibitory 
connections, on the other hand, hinder self-enhancement, because the value conferred by 
satisfying one interest impedes the progress of a competing one. For example, receiving a 
desired promotion, which fulfills one’s financial interests, might interfere with an interest 
in a harmonious family life. 
  A diversified interest network aids in the pursuit of self-enhancement and self-
protection. People whose interests are grouped into a small number of categories have 
fewer options when events conspire to threaten their cherished self-views (Linville, 
1985). For example, a person whose self-concept is predominantly based on an interest in 
material wealth might possess insufficient resources to combat an extreme financial 
setback. When interests are diversified, however, a setback in one category can be at least 
partially offset by emphasizing or altering a self-view in another. Thus, a person who 
experiences a severe financial setback may compensate by highlighting or elevating his 
perceptions of himself as a good husband and father. 
  The strength of associations among horizontally-oriented and vertically-oriented 
interests in the hierarchy can foster or impede self-enhancement and self-protection, 
depending on whether an experience is positive or negative and the associations are 
facilitative or inhibitory. When an event reflects favourably on a particular interest, 
facilitative vertical connections translate the event into positive, higher-level 
characteristics. For example, successfully learning to play a piece of music on the guitar 
may lead to feelings of musical competence, and then to more general conceptions of 
being a competent person. Inhibitory connections primarily serve self-protection 
functions; in particular, to avoid the spread of negative events throughout the self-system. 
However, when strong inhibitory connections are formed, they can have the unwanted 
effect of preventing the spread of positive experiences. For example, a person who 
habitually and assiduously avoids translating negative social feedback from peers into 
higher-level personality characteristics may become so practiced at inhibiting these 
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behaviour-trait connections that she or he fails to do so for positive feedback.  
Continuing the previous example for horizontal connections, the same feelings of 
musical competence may lead to feeling skilled at other artistic endeavours and thereby 
advance interests in those related areas. We refer to such facilitative connections as 
“horizontal spread.” Again, inhibitory connections prevent the spread of positive 
experiences. People with highly compartmentalized self-systems (McConnell & Strain, 
2007; Showers, 1992) may routinely confine their experiences to one interest area and 
therefore fail to experience the benefits of relating positive experiences to other interest 
categories. 
When it comes to negative events, facilitative vertical and horizontal connections 
are detrimental. Failing an important exam may make a person feel bad at the material the 
course covers and then spill over into more general feelings of incompetence (vertical 
direction). Similarly, feeling incompetent in the material a course covers can lead to 
feelings of incompetence in other areas (horizontal direction). One of the main functions 
of self-protection processes is to prevent these negative consequences of vertical and 
horizontal connections in interest networks. As noted above, inhibitory connections are 
enlisted in this service such that a negative event in one interest area shuts down related 
areas to which the implications of the negative event might apply. For example, receiving 
negative feedback about one’s loyalty from a friend could easily affect interests in related 
social categories such as trustworthiness or kindness (horizontal connections) as well as 
higher-level interests in being a popular or even a good person (vertical connections). 
Inhibitory connections are an important aspect of mental health in that they confine 
negative experiences to the interest categories to which they most directly pertain. 
Interest Levels 
As Figure 2 depicts, we conceive each subordinate interest to contain an 
aspiration level, which represents an individual’s ideal level of functioning, a perceived 
level, which represents where the person believes that he or she currently stands with 
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respect to that interest, an objective level, which represents where the person actually 
stands, and a tolerance level, below which the person is motivated to engage primary or 
secondary control mechanisms to advance back toward the aspiration point.  
Interests can be advanced, regressed, reversed, or maintained at their current level 
by specific events and outcomes (Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, & Zhang, 1997). For 
example, a person with an interest in viewing himself as a chess expert can have this 
interest advanced by winning a chess tournament (primary control). Alternatively, the 
same person might advance his interest by playing an inferior opponent and exaggerating 
the opponent’s ability (secondary control). Examples of declining interests abound: in 
essence, any form of task or social feedback that threatens to move a perceived 
characteristic away from the aspiration point represents a regression in an interest level. 
An example of an interest reversal is represented by a husband who, while 
advancing his interest in being a good parent, receives criticism from his wife. In this 
example, the husband experiences a reversal of an interest that had been advancing. 
Going in the opposite direction, a student whose interest in seeing herself as a good 
mathematician had been declining due to poor course performance may have this interest 
level reversed by a high math score on a national standardized examination. Interests can 
also change in their rate of acceleration toward or away from the aspiration point. 
However, if interests advance too slowly, or in a way that suggests that the aspiration 
level is unattainable, secondary control may be engaged even when primary control 
efforts are ostensibly successful. A student who falls behind his peers due to failure on 
several medical school exams may conclude that the medical profession is rather dull and 
tedious and thus not worth pursuing (e.g., the sour grapes effect; Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 
2002; Wilson, Wheatley, Kurtz, Dunn, & Gilbert, 2004). 
The distance between the perceived level of a characteristic and the aspiration 
level, along with the centrality of the characteristic, determine the need for self-
enhancement. In general, primary and secondary control are engaged more vigorously for 
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characteristics that are farther from the aspiration point. The strength of such processes is 
increased for central (as opposed to peripheral) characteristics, that is, for characteristics 
on which people stake their self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001).  
The distance between the perceived level and the objective level defines the 
instability of self-conceptions. A moral hypocrite, for example, who proclaims exemplary 
behavioural standards but whose actual behaviour contradicts these proclamations, faces 
an uphill battle to maintain his illusions. Whereas discrepancies between perceived and 
aspired levels pose quandaries about how to attain one’s goals, large discrepancies 
between perceived and objective levels threaten one’s ability to test reality. Maintaining a 
desired belief in the face of objective disconfirmation taxes self-enhancement or self-
protection efforts, perhaps because it impairs resources used for self-control (Vohs, 
Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). 
Self-Enhancement, Self-Protection, and Interest Networks 
Within this framework of increasing and declining interests, self-enhancement can 
be viewed as a self-maintenance mechanism that strives to preserve one’s perceived level 
of functioning or to move it closer to the aspiration level. This function can be achieved 
either through primary or secondary control processes. With all other things being equal, 
primary control is preferable to secondary control. The need for secondary control arises, 
however, when people cannot approximate their aspiration levels by primary control 
alone. Nevertheless, reasonable progress toward the aspiration level via primary control 
makes secondary control processes easier to engage and defend. A person who is actually 
becoming more considerate, for example, can exaggerate his or her standing on this trait 
more easily than one who is making no discernible progress toward the aspired level. 
Secondary control includes construal and memory mechanisms that are designed 
to exaggerate the favourability of an event or characteristic, or to minimize its negativity. 
When these mechanisms fail, another possibility is to reduce the aspiration level so that a 
lower level of functioning on the characteristic becomes tolerable. 
 
This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection  16 
The constructs in which people are chronically invested (i.e., in which they have 
important interests) typically represent compromises between their objective level of 
functioning and their aspirations. The primary way that self-enhancement maintains these 
superordinate interests is by defining self-constructs at an abstract level (Liberman, 
Trope, & Stephan, 2007). In this way, self-enhancement strivings are protected against 
objectively poor behavioural outcomes by the difficulty of contradicting abstract self-
conceptions. Even if a student performs poorly in her university degree, her perception of 
herself as an “intelligent” person remains unaffected due to the absence of critical tests 
for the trait “intelligent.” When behavioural adjustments occur, they represent relatively 
minor tweaks to the data such as according undue weight to positive outcomes that are 
non-diagnostic of intelligence and according too little weight to highly diagnostic 
information. Even lowering the aspiration level is often a subtle adjustment rather than 
blatant self-deception.  
Self-enhancement is also served by factoring projected selves (Markus & Nurius, 
1986) into self-definitional equations. In this way, people may reason that, while they do 
not presently exhibit much ambition, they will undoubtedly be prodigious in the future. 
Along these same lines, people harbour fantasies and aspirations that are hidden from 
others and that may also contribute to their elevated self-conceptions (Klinger, 1990; 
Oettingen, 1996; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Finally, 
selecting situations that encourage success and discourage failure (e.g., the “hometown 
hero” who never ventures into more competitive waters), or selecting peers who provide 
predominantly positive feedback, are other common ways of satisfying superordinate or 
subordinate interests and furthering self-enhancement. In general, therefore, the work that 
self-enhancement does on experiential data is routine and undramatic. Furthermore, when 
interests are objectively advanced or maintained at an acceptable level, there is very little 
need to invoke secondary control processes.  
Self-protection is, by contrast, an emergency system that operates when interests 
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are threatened by a possible decline in a self-component below the tolerance point. Put 
simply, self-protection is a form of damage control. The difference between self-
enhancement and self-protection can be likened to the difference between the 
parasympathetic and sympathetic functions of the autonomic nervous system. The 
parasympathetic system is responsible for regulating ordinary processes of respiration 
and digestion. Analogously, self-enhancement regulates the superordinate needs to feel 
good and to view oneself positively by making slight adjustments in response to 
environmental disturbances. The sympathetic component of the autonomic system, on the 
other hand, is an arousal system that marshals the body’s defenses to counteract 
environmental challenges or threats. Likewise, self-protective processes are evoked when 
environmental feedback threatens to reduce an interest below the tolerance point.  
Self-protection can also be evoked by a failure of interests to advance sufficiently. 
A common self-protective mechanism is to assume that unacceptable present 
circumstances will improve in the future. People who are in financial difficulty, for 
example, might dream of winning the lottery and deflect current difficulties with the 
vague assumption of future riches. Mid-life identity crises occur, in part, due to the 
recognition that the “tomorrow” so long awaited-for has arrived with no discernible 
advancement in interests. Self-protective mechanisms, therefore, are more elaborate, 
dramatic, and difficult to maintain than self-enhancing ones. Consistent with this 
assumption, the tendency to view one’s traits more favourably than others’ (representing  
high-level interests) is greater when considering negative characteristics than when 
considering positive ones (Alicke & Govorun, 2005).  
Whereas self-enhancement strategies typically represent only a minor discrepancy 
between perceived and objective self-components, self-protective processes sometimes 
require considerable distortion in order to raise the self back toward the aspiration point, 
or to prevent further slippage. When an aspiring poet, for example, is rejected by virtually 
every publication outlet, her continued belief in her superior skill may require extreme 
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measures such as denigrating the whole enterprise of modern poetry. Reality constraints 
make such self-protective processes difficult to maintain. The success of other poets, the 
relative transparency of the system, and the continued rejection of one’s own works 
necessitates unusual creativity to maintain the desired self-conception. 
Relation between Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection 
Although self-enhancement and self-protection are sometimes treated as polar 
ends of a single dimension, our analysis of interests, and empirical evidence as well, 
suggests that they should be treated separately (Elliot & Mapes, 2005; Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008). In our account, self-enhancement is a routine function that operates to 
maintain interests in reasonable and defensible proximity to their aspiration levels. Self-
protective mechanisms are evoked when an event, or series of events, threatens to decline 
an interest below the tolerance level, or when high-level interests fail to advance as 
anticipated. 
Explicating the relation between self-enhancement and self-protection is 
complicated by the fact that some psychological theories and phenomena primarily 
involve one of these motives, some entail both, and in some instances, self-protective 
efforts further self-enhancement goals (Sedikides & Green, in press; Sedikides & Luke, 
2007; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). For example, individuals are relatively open to negative 
feedback (Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005) or remember it well (Green, Sedikides, Pinter, 
& Van Tongeren, in press) when such openness or efficient memory enables future task 
performance or enable good interpersonal relationships. In this case, immediate self-
protection concerns relax to make room for long-term self-enhancement gains.  In 
practice, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish unequivocally among these possibilities 
due to the absence of baseline measures to indicate perceived and objective levels of 
functioning with regard to an interest, or to indicate assessments of aspiration and 
tolerance levels. It is possible, however, to characterize approximately the relevant 
literature according to whether a phenomenon is most likely to involve self-enhancement, 
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self-protection, or both. 
Examples of self-enhancement primarily entail mid-level or high-level interests 
such as thinking about oneself in positive global trait terms (e.g., power/effectance). A 
prominent case is the better-than-average effect: people rate themselves more favourably 
than an average peer on most trait dimensions (Alicke, 1985; Alicke, Klotz, 
Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). 
Although various non-motivational mechanisms contribute to the better-than-average 
effect (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Heine & Hamamura, 2007), the effect is at least 
partly due to the desire to maintain a favourable self view (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; 
Alicke, Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001; Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008). 
Indeed, people do truly believe they are above average (Williams & Gilovich, 2008). 
  Self-protection has been aroused in legions of social-psychological studies in 
which important interests (such as to be intelligent) are threatened in order to assess the 
effects on various aspects of behaviour or judgement (Beauregard & Dunning, 1998; 
Buckingham & Alicke, 2002; Green & Sedikides, 2004; Guenther & Alicke, 2008). For 
the most part, the behavioural and attributional strategies that emerge serve to avoid 
decrements in self-views rather than to promote one’s standing on a dimension 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Students who are told that they are 
in the 20
th percentile on a novel intelligence test, for example, are more likely to find 
ways to avoid reducing their beliefs in their intelligence than they are to find ways of 
increasing them.  
The self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Mezulis et al., 2004) reflects 
both self-enhancement and self-protection. This phenomenon entails taking more credit 
than one deserves for positive outcomes (i.e., self-enhancement), as well as failing to 
accept adequate responsibility for negative outcomes (i.e., self-protection). Striving to 
enhance the value of positive outcomes serves self-enhancement, whereas striving to 
deflect blame for negative outcomes serves self-protection, assuming that the negative 
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outcome or feedback threatens to reduce an interest below tolerance. 
  Instances in which self-protective mechanisms wind up serving self-enhancement 
have long been recognized by psychologists, most notably in the guise of the Freudian 
defense mechanisms (A. Freud, 1936/1946; S. Freud, 1926/1961). In current social 
psychology, Terror-Management Theory (TMT) provides a cogent example. According 
to TMT, people marshal various resources to deflect anxiety-arousing thoughts about 
their mortality. In this respect, TMT falls squarely into the self-protection camp. 
However, many of the terror management strategies that people deploy have self-
enhancing consequences, such as bolstering self-esteem, fostering interpersonal 
relationships, promoting ingroup solidarity, supporting cultural institutions, and even 
motivating the creation of enduring artworks (Arndt, Routledge, Greenberg, & Sheldon, 
2005; Castano, Yzerbyt, & Paladino, 2004; Mikulincer, Florian, & Hirschberger, 2003). 
In fact, in its most recent incarnations (Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & 
Martens, 2006; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Goldenberg, 2003; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004), TMT focuses as much on the positive or self-
enhancing implications of existential anxiety as on its harmful or destructive 
consequences.  
In this regard, protection against existential anxiety is similar to many of the 
Freudian defense mechanisms, which are also purported to have self-enhancing 
consequences. Reaction formation, for example, presumably enables people with moral 
shortcomings to view themselves as paragons of morality (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 
1998). Similarly, projection can create an illusion of superiority by transferring a person’s 
own negative qualities onto others (Schimel, Greenberg, & Martens, 2003).  
Just as defense mechanisms against anxiety and unfavourable self-views can 
transmute self-protection into positive high-level interests, self-enhancement can serve 
self-protection interests. Narcissism is a case in point. When threatened with negative 
performance feedback, narcissists defend themselves through such self-enhancing 
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strategies as displaying the self-serving bias even when the slighted co-worker is a friend 
(Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000), or derogating and punishing critics 
(Bushman & Baumeister, 1998) in a presumed effort to regain control (DeWall, 
Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007).  
Practical difficulties sometimes obfuscate the distinction between self-
enhancement and self-protection. A person who exaggerates her contribution to a group 
effort may do so protectively (e.g., to avoid looking bad) or enhancingly (e.g., to 
convince herself and others that she has been underestimated). Furthermore, people are 
often unaware of which goals they are pursuing. Similarly, people may engage in wishful 
or fanciful thinking (e.g., imagining inherited wealth) in order to pull themselves out of 
their financial doldrums (self-protection) or to elevate their standing on the relevant self-
domain (e.g., prosperity) (self-enhancement). 
What Kind of Explanations Do Self-Enhancement/Self-Protection Interpretations 
Provide? 
  In this section, we clarify four specific points about self-enhancement and self-
protection as explanatory mechanisms that have sometimes been obscured in the 
literature. First, virtually all interesting psychological phenomena are multiply 
determined. Self-enhancement and self-protection, therefore, never provide complete 
accounts of behaviour or judgement. To include self-enhancement and self-protection in 
explanations is to argue that these motives are necessary components of a behaviour or 
judgement. For example, it may be impossible to understand why a man who is 
continually rejected by women persists in viewing himself as a Lothario without 
recognizing the importance of this identity-image in his self-concept. In this case, self-
enhancement and self-protection are necessary components of the explanation.  
Second, it is critical to reiterate that self-enhancement and self-protection are very 
specific types of motives. To say that a behaviour was motivated is not necessarily to 
claim that self-enhancement or self-protection was involved. Self-enhancement and self-
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protection motives are invoked when investigators wish to claim that behaviour was 
impelled by the desire to elevate self-regard or to avoid reducing it. In this sense, the 
“cognition versus motivation” distinction that has pervaded the psychological literature 
can be misleading. All purposive behaviour is motivated or else people would do nothing 
at all. Similarly, all non-reflexive behaviour involves cognitive processes. The crucial 
question, therefore, is whether the self-enhancement/self-protection motives increase the 
predictive and explanatory power of the phenomenon under investigation or whether it is 
possible to account for an effect without reference to these motives. The primary 
advantage of non-motivational explanations is parsimony: If a phenomenon can be 
explained solely in terms of cognitive processes, then that is one less set of variables to 
account for. 
The parsimony claim can be deceiving, however. Explanations that suffice outside 
the social realm are often inadequate when applied to social behaviour and judgement. 
Stereotyping provides a prominent example. As a form of categorization, stereotyping is 
a natural outgrowth of the non-motivated tendency to distinguish among classes of 
objects. In fact, early social-cognitive treatments of stereotyping emphasized this 
categorization explanation (Brewer, 1988; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Rothbart & John, 
1985). However, while it is important to recognize that the natural tendency to categorize 
makes some form of stereotyping inevitable, it is probably true that relatively few 
instances of placing people in pernicious social categories can be explained purely by this 
propensity, and current views recognize that stereotyping can also reflect motives such as 
defensive projection (Govorun, Fuegen, & Payne, 2006). Again, in our view, the most 
complete explanations for social behaviour and judgement are likely to involve both the 
reasons that spurred the event (although these reasons will not always entail self-
enhancement or self-protection) and the cognitive processes involved. 
  Third, self-enhancement and self-protection can be achieved without any motive 
to enhance or maintain self-views. As Miller and Ross (1975) noted, expectancies 
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provide one non-motivational explanation for such effects: People simply expect to do 
well and align their perceptions with these expectancies. Even when expectancies suffice, 
however, they may inadvertently serve self-enhancement. A person who blames others 
for his misfortunes rather than himself because he (non-motivationally) expects that 
others are more likely to be at fault, winds up accruing the same self-benefits as one 
whose implicit or explicit motive is to feel better about himself. Biased memories are an 
even more potent source of non-motivational self-enhancement and self-protection. When 
people work on collaborative tasks, for example, their own inputs are naturally more 
salient (Harris, 2007). Thus, it is important to distinguish between self-enhancement and 
self-protection as processes that are motivated by the desire to promote or protect a self-
image, and between self-enhancement and self-protection that are achieved as offshoots 
of non-motivated processes (Gramzow & Willard, 2006). The former are purposeful, 
whereas the latter are inadvertent.  
  Fourth, invoking self-enhancement or self-protection explanations for an event 
does not imply that these motives are universally linked to such events. For example, the 
claim that a person denied responsibility for a bad decision in order to avoid self-blame 
does not entail that all such denials reflect motivated processes. Similarly, claims for 
motivated self-enhancement and self-protection do not exclude the possibility that other 
motivational and non-motivational mechanisms operate simultaneously. 
What Kinds of Motives Are Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection? 
Although we view the cognition-motivation distinction as a useful heuristic for 
highlighting different aspects of psychological explanation, the distinction is sometimes 
obscured by a failure to analyze carefully the properties of self-enhancement and self-
protection motives. We begin this section, therefore, by examining the sense in which 
judgements and actions reflecting self-enhancement and self-protection can be said to be 
biased or in error, and clarify the distinction between bias and error. Subsequently, we 
examine the conscious or unconscious nature of these motives and consider the aims 
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toward which they are directed. This is followed by a consideration of whether and to 
what extent people engage in self-deception when their actions and judgements are 
characterized by self-enhancement or self-protection.  
Relation to Error and Bias 
  Researchers who study self-enhancement and self-protection from a motivational 
perspective generally imply that such judgements are biased or erroneous, but the nature 
of the presumed bias or error is not always obvious. To assess the relation between self-
enhancement and self-protection on the one hand, and error and bias on the other, it is 
important to be clear about the distinction between error and bias (Funder, 1987; Krizan 
& Windschitl, 2007; Kruglanski, 1989). An error is a mistake made in relation to a well-
established criterion. For example, a person who thinks that it is Tuesday when it is 
actually Wednesday has made an error by the universally-accepted standards of the 
calendar.  
By contrast, a bias is a systematic propensity to reach a certain conclusion. 
Whereas error refers to the outcome of a judgement, in particular whether the judgement 
is correct or incorrect, bias refers to its derivation. Biases and errors are not necessarily 
related. On any particular occasion, a person can be biased but error-free, or erroneous 
and unbiased. An example of the former is a person with a biased view of his golfing 
abilities (consistently overestimating) who manages to outplay a far superior opponent. 
Similarly, a racially-biased juror may assume, correctly as it turns out, that a Black 
defendant is guilty of a crime. Example of erroneous and unbiased judgements abound: 
Essentially, all random errors fall into this category. Thus, a person who simply guesses, 
incorrectly, that she will lose a competition that she actually wins is erroneous but not 
necessarily biased. 
Biases and errors can represent purely perceptual or cognitive distortions, or they 
can serve one or more of an actor’s interests. For example, a person who is nearsighted or 
farsighted has a purely perceptual bias of the visual field, one which is erroneous as well. 
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On the other hand, biased views of one’s own traits and abilities, or stereotyped 
expectations for certain minority groups, can be purposive to the extent that they 
represent self-promotion, either by exaggerating one’s own virtues, or by derogating 
those of another person or group. Biased judges may ignore evidence that contradicts a 
desired conclusion or distort evidence to support that conclusion.  
  Viewed in this context, self-enhancement and self-protection motives yield 
judgements that are biased by the wish to raise a specific or global self-component 
beyond its current level (i.e., closer to the aspiration level), or to avoid falling below the 
tolerance level. Such judgements can be correct or incorrect, although biased judgements 
will likely yield more erroneous judgements than unbiased ones in the long run. 
Judgements that are both biased and erroneous require the most arduous self-
enhancement and self-protection efforts to overcome the reality constraints that contradict 
them. People who consistently adhere to manifestly erroneous judgements are sometimes 
said to be “in denial.” 
Implicit versus Explicit Aspect 
  A notable feature of self-enhancement and self-protection motives is that they can 
be unconscious or implicit. Furthermore, their inaccessibility is different from that of 
biological motives such as maintaining an optimal balance of blood nutrients. When 
people self-enhance or self-protect, researchers typically assume that they have reasons 
for their actions that they are unable or unwilling to explicate (Peters, 1958). For 
example, a racially-prejudiced person might deny that the reason he dislikes minorities is 
that he is motivated to maintain a positive view of himself by derogating others. 
Similarly, someone who believes that she is above average on virtually all desirable 
characteristics might fail to recognize that this view serves to maintain positive, self-
related affect as well as an interest in self-perceptions of competence and all-around 
goodness. 
  The implicit aspect of self-enhancement and self-protection is tied to the Freudian 
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legacy of unconscious motives whose purpose is to protect the self (i.e., the “ego”). 
However, the social-psychological use of these terms is much broader than the Freudian 
one. Whereas Sigmund Freud (1915/1961a, 1923/1961b, 1926/1961c) and Anna Freud 
(1936/1946) believed that the ego defenses were invoked to repress sexual and aggressive 
urges, the social-psychological use of self-protection and self-enhancement motives 
applies to any self-related interest, including perceptions of own faces, abilities, social 
and physical traits, moral standing, beliefs, and values (Dunning, 1999; Epley & 
Whitchurch, 2008; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Social and personality psychologists have, 
therefore, expanded considerably the scope of interests to which the self-enhancement 
and self-protection motives apply. In the modern scheme, virtually any self-aspect that is 
a source of interest or value, or is capable of producing significant psychic pleasure or 
pain, is a candidate for strategic maneuvering. 
  Demonstrations of implicit self-enhancement in the research literature are 
plentiful. The name-letter effect is one of the most compelling (Nuttin, 1985). In a typical 
study, research participants, when presented with pairs of letters, one from their name and 
one that is not from their name, reliably prefer the letter that is included in their name. 
Furthermore, participants are unaware that the basis of their preference inheres in the 
association of the letter with their names. Other examples of implicit self-enhancement 
phenomena include viewing others stereotypically after receiving negative feedback 
(Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), or counterstereotypically after being praised by a minority 
group member (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). 
Role of Self-Deception 
  An important conceptual issue regarding self-enhancement and self-protection is 
whether self-deception is a necessary component of these motives. In other words, do 
people know what they are “up to” when they engage in self-enhancement or self-
protection? If so, at what level of awareness are such strategies registered? 
Consider the example of a student who blames everyone but his own poor study 
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habits for a low test grade. Penetrating these excuses is sometimes as simple as raising an 
eyebrow, or if that does not work, asking the student to reflect on his or her test 
preparation. Rather than representing deeply-buried unconscious needs, self-serving 
tendencies can be motivational ploys of which people are vaguely aware but refuse to 
“spell out” (Fingarette, 2000). This might be called a light versus a deep form of self-
deception, one that is akin to failing to open mail that contains unwanted bills 
(Greenwald, 1980). In fact, many of the self-protective or self-enhancing tendencies that 
social psychologists study, in contrast to the unconscious motives that the Freuds 
postulated, are probably of this preconscious variety. For example, people defend 
themselves by reinterpreting negative attributes or minimizing their impact by placing 
them in a broader context (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Murray, 1999).  
When extreme self-deceptions occur, they are more likely to be enlisted for self-
protection than self-enhancement. Whereas self-enhancement is a luxury, self-protection 
is a necessity. Except for psychotic delusions and extreme personality disorders, self-
enhancement includes mundane tendencies such as thinking that one is slightly better 
than others, choosing to compare with worse-off others, and construing events in a way 
that frames one’s actions and attributes in a positive light. These tendencies can 
sometimes be subverted simply by pointing out the facts to the self-enhancer.  
The self-deception involved in self-protection, on the other hand, can be far more 
potent, and hence, much more difficult to overcome. Examples abound. Parents refuse to 
believe the misdeeds of their children even when the facts are obvious; patients go to 
great lengths to ignore serious health conditions; people make excuses for poor or 
improper social behaviour that stretch the credulity; individuals are convinced they are 
morally motivated, and they resort to moral superiority judgements when their rationality 
and agency are questioned; and a large proportion of the civilized world believes that 
they will lead many, and perhaps infinitely many, lives (Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 
2002; Hoorens, 1993; Jordan & Monin, 2008; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008).  
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Because self-analysis is frequently a complex and obscure task, however 
(Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007), dramatic processes such as repression and denial 
rarely need to be invoked. To take a mundane example, analyzing one’s traits and 
abilities requires assessing how one fares in the general distribution of these 
characteristics. If I were to assess my general intelligence, for example, I should locate 
where I stand on this trait in a relevant population: It matters little whether I have gotten 
smarter over time, particularly if others have gotten smarter at an even faster rate. In a 
rational sense, therefore, large-sample social comparison information trumps temporal 
comparison for analyzing general characteristics. Nevertheless, recent research has 
shown that people use temporal comparison information selectively to further self-
enhancement and self-protection purposes. In one study (Zell & Alicke, in press), actors 
took different parts of a social sensitivity test biweekly for a 10-week period, and 
received feedback about their increasing or decreasing performance over that period 
(temporal comparison information), as well as information about whether they generally 
performed better or worse than a large sample of other students who took the same test 
(social comparison information). Yoked observers simply learned of the actors’ 
performance over time and were exposed to the same social comparison information. 
Results showed that observers paid no attention to temporal comparison information, 
basing their evaluations of the actors’ social sensitivity skills purely on whether they 
performed better or worse than others. Actors, on the other hand, eschewed temporal 
comparison information when it suggested that their performance declined, but used it to 
their advantage when it suggested that they were getting better. Consequently, actors 
evaluated themselves more favourably than did observers regardless of whether social 
comparison information indicated that they were better or worse than others. In such 
nuanced feedback environments, elaborate self-deceptions are not required; rather, simple 
and chronic biases suffice to enhance and protect the self. 
On Motive Activation and Moderating Conditions 
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 Situationally-elicited  self-enhancement/self-protection can be understood in terms 
of the traditional motivational language of Dollard and Miller (1950). Self-enhancement 
encompasses various approach motives that guide people toward selecting situations in 
which they are likely to excel, and toward promoting their virtues when there is no fear of 
contradiction. Self-protection, on the other hand, comprises an assortment of avoidance 
tendencies, and involves retreating from threatening situations, making excuses designed 
to deflect negative self-implications, misremembering unfavourable information about 
the self, avoiding situations that threaten failure, and evaluating other people and groups 
unfavourably to maintain relatively positive self-views.  
  We have described self-enhancement as a largely routine regulatory system that 
operates to maintain interests in acceptable proximity to their aspired levels. However, 
self-enhancement processes are also activated by situational opportunities. Small gains, 
such as minor recognitions and faint praise, can be exaggerated; situations in which the 
deck is stacked in one’s favour can be approached (e.g., a student taking an easy class); 
and peers can be selected with whom comparisons are likely to be favourable (e.g., an 
older child entering into competitions with younger ones). 
  Affect plays a relatively minor role in self-enhancement. Events that arouse 
positive affect may fuel self-enhancement efforts, such as when the positive emotional 
impact of a successful event boosts related self-constructs—what we have referred to as 
horizontal spread (Sedikides, 1992). On the other hand, negative affect is a necessary 
concomitant of self-protection (Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, & Evans, 1998). Self-
protection, as described earlier, occurs when events threaten to reduce an interest below 
tolerance. However, if the interest in one’s standing with regard to a self-construct is only 
tepid, self-protective efforts will be minimal or absent. For example, a person who has no 
desire to be perceived as rude, but does not care a great deal about this characteristic 
anyway, will have little motivation for self-protection, even when events conspire to 
make her appear more rude than his tolerance level permits. The context in which self-
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enhancement and self-protection motives are potentiated, therefore, largely determines 
their strength. These motives are at their fullest strength when a characteristic is central to 
the individual’s identity, and when an evaluative audience is an important source of 
social or material reward (Kelly, 2000; Leary, 1995). 
  Given that self-enhancement and self-protection are but two of the many motives 
that drive self-evaluation and social-evaluation, their initiation depends on the standing of 
other motivational conditions. When the stakes are high, and the penalties for bias and 
error are substantial, accuracy needs may trump self-enhancement/self-protection motives 
(Dauenheimer, Stahlberg, Spreeman, & Sedikides, 2002; Sedikides & Strube, 2007). 
People will process carefully and remember negative feedback that is diagnostic of their 
limitations (Green, Pinter, & Sedikides, 2005 As much as an adolescent music aficionado 
might like to imagine herself performing to the adulation of millions, a complete lack of 
musical ability will usually reel in these ambitions. (Observation of the tryouts for the 
popular “American Idol” and “Britain’s Got Talent” television shows suggests, however, 
that the latitude for such fantasies is fairly wide.)   
The objective determinability of the judgement dimension also constrains the 
operation of self-enhancement and self-protection: After losing a tennis match without 
winning a game, it would be pathetic to claim that one’s opponent had a lucky day. 
Furthermore, as Swann and his colleagues (Swann, Rentrow, & Guinn, 2003) have 
demonstrated in numerous studies, the self-system tends to be conservative, and so 
fluctuations in current self-conceptions are unlikely to vary dramatically as the result of 
self-enhancement and self-protection forces. Primarily, these motives serve to maintain 
specific and global self-concepts at a point that is slightly-to-moderately above the 
veridical level. Note, however, that objectivity and reality can be stretched to 
accommodate self-protective responding (i.e., social comparisons) as a response to self-
threat (Stapel & Johnson, 2007, Study 1).  
 Cultural Specificity versus Universality of Motives 
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  Self-enhancement and self-protection motives are also manifested differently 
across cultures. At the explicit level, Easterners (e.g., Japanese) self-enhance less than 
Westerners (e.g., Americans); that is, the former are less likely to self-aggrandize openly 
than the latter (Heine & Hamamura, 2007). However, Easterners self-enhance 
strategically and selectively. In particular, they privately rate themselves as better-than-
average on domains that are personally-important to them (i.e., collectivistic attributes 
such as loyal or respectful). Westerners also manifest the same strategic self-
enhancement pattern by privately rating themselves as better-than-average on personally-
important domains (i.e., individualistic attributes such as self-reliant or leader) 
(Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005, 2007a,b). Crucially, an Eastern public preference 
for collectivistic attributes (e.g., conformity) can also be a strategic, self-protective 
attempt to avoid a negative reputation (Yamagichi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008). 
  Indeed, although manifestations of self-enhancement and self-protection differ 
depending on cultural context (Matsumoto, 2007), the motives appear to be equally 
powerful across cultures. At the implicit level (e.g., response latencies, name-letter 
preferences, birthday-number preferences, semantic priming), Easterners love the self as 
much as Westerners do (Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; 
Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Also, Easterners do manifest the self-serving bias (Mezulis et 
al., 2004). In addition, average levels of self-esteem lie above theoretical scale midpoints, 
while trait self-enhancement (e.g., self-esteem) shows the same structure (i.e., same 
pattern of correlations with other personality traits) across both Eastern and Western 
cultures (Cai, Wu, & Brown, in press; Schmitt & Allik, 2005; Sheldon, Elliot, Kasser, & 
Kim, 2001). Finally, self-enhancement tendencies are positively related to psychological 
health in both the West (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003a) and the 
East (Cai et al., in press; Gaertner et al., 2008), a topic to which we will return. 
What the Motives Accomplish 
  The purpose of the Freudian defense mechanisms is to counteract debilitating 
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anxiety. However, anxiety is neither a necessary nor perhaps even a prevalent component 
of the social-psychological analysis of self-enhancement and self-protection motives. For 
example, self-enhancement can reflect a quest for self-improvement in a particular 
domain (Sedikides, 1999, in press) or the illusion of self-improvement (Ross & Wilson, 
2003). Likewise, self-protection occurs for purposes such as to avoid losing confidence in 
a goal-pursuit (Paulhus, Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997; Sedikides, Green, & Pinter, 2004; 
Tesser, 2003). Chronic strategies such as defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986) 
are concocted to avoid disappointments, or to palliate their effects, and, if successful, 
protect the self by lowering tolerance. 
  What, then, is the object of a self-protective motive such as taking less 
responsibility than one deserves for failure? In keeping with our depiction of 
hierarchically-related interests, we argue that such motives serve both lower-level and 
higher-level interests in the vertical hierarchy. For Freud, the first level of self-protection 
is to avoid threatening sexual and aggressive thoughts, with the ulterior goal of 
controlling or limiting anxiety. In our view, the immediate interest of self-serving 
motives and actions is to enhance or defend a specific self-aspect, whereas the broader 
interest is to maintain the highest feasible level of positive self-evaluations and 
psychological health. For example, making excuses for poor performance on a math test 
ameliorates unfavourable evaluations of one’s math ability and ultimately serves to 
prevent negative affect associated with the performance, as well as the spread of negative 
affect into other self-aspects (Snyder & Higgins, 1988).  
Benefits and Costs 
  Self-enhancement and self-protection entail physical health benefits (Creswell et 
al., 205; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003b). In particular, as a 
response to stress, high (compared to low) self-enhancers have lower cardiovascular 
responses, more rapid cardiovascular recovery, and lower baseline cortisol levels. Self-
enhancement appears to serve a stress-buffering function. 
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In addition, self-enhancement and self-protection entail psychological health 
benefits. For example, self-enhancement (multiply operationalized) linearly predicts 
psychological health (Sedikides et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2003a; see also Gramzow, 
Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000). Specifically, self-enhancement is positively related to 
psychological resources (e.g., extraversion, positive reframing, optimism, mastery, 
planning, active coping), social resources (e.g., positive relations, family support), and 
psychological adjustment (e.g., purpose in life, personal growth, subjective well-being); 
on the other hand, self-enhancement is negatively related to psychological distress (e.g., 
anxiety, depression, neuroticism, hostility). Furthermore, self-enhancement is positively 
related to the psychological health (e.g., positive affect, resilience) of high-exposure 
survivors of the September 11 terrorist attack (Bonanno, Rennicke, & Dekel, 2005). 
Finally, self-enhancement is positively related to psychological health (e.g., subjective 
well-being, self-esteem) and is negatively related to psychological distress (e.g., 
depression) not only in individualistic cultures but also in collectivistic cultures such as 
China (Anderson, 1999; Cai et al., in press), Hong Kong (Stewart et al., 2003), Japan 
(Kobayashi & Brown, 2003), Korea (Chang, Sanna, & Yang, 2003), Taiwan (Gaertner et 
al., 2008), and Singapore (Kurman & Sriram, 1997). As another case in point, self-
enhancement is positively related to the psychological health of civilians exposed to 
urban combat at war time and also predicts the psychological health of widows two years 
later (Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002) in Bosnia. More generally, high 
self-esteem confers vital benefits to the individual (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & 
McClarty, 2007), such as psychological health (Trzesniewski et al., 2006), social 
acceptance (Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001), and existential safety (Pyszczynski et al., 
2004).  
Does self-enhancement entail social costs? Individuals (e.g., narcissists) who 
present themselves to others in an overly grandiose or arrogant manner invite dislike and 
derision (Robins & Beer, 2001; Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007; Sedikides, Campbell, 
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Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002), and this is no surprise given that the norm of modesty is 
valued in the West (Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008; Sedikides et al., 2007). 
Such boasters may cope with disapproval by being unaware of it (Kenny & DePaulo, 
1993) or immune to it (Robins & Beer, 2001). Regardless, most people engage in a 
slightly or moderately positive self-presentation, a tactic that safeguards considerably 
against disapproval. Indeed, positive self-presentation predicts success in social groups 
and exchange relationships (Baumeister, 1982; Hogan 1982). For example, observers 
perceive actors who claim superior problem-solving skills as honest (Vonk, 1999), and 
perceive actors who express self-superiority beliefs as open, assertive, and extraverted 
(Bond, Kwan, & Li, 2000). Moreover, moderate self-enhancers do not appear to endure 
long-term relational liabilities. For example, high self-esteem facilitates, and low self-
esteem constrains, relationship development and satisfaction (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 
2000; Murray, Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002). In all, slight-to-moderate (i.e., 
non-narcissistic) self-enhancement appears to entail more social benefits than social 
costs. 
  Supporting Self-Enhancement/Self-Protection Interpretations 
Common Ways to Support Self-Enhancement/Self-Protection Explanations 
  The most compelling way to support empirically self-enhancement/self-protection 
explanations is to introduce manipulations that potentially affect a self-aspect and then 
assess their consequences on self- or social-evaluation. Manipulations used in this 
capacity include providing low versus high performance feedback, furnishing negative 
versus positive personality feedback, reminding people of their mortality versus a 
different negative stimulus (e.g., dental pain), supplying objective data to indicate that 
people’s behaviours or characteristics are either worse versus better than others’, 
conveying social criticism versus praise, or introducing superior versus inferior 
comparison others (Alicke et al., 1997; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Pyszczynski et al., 
2004; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). 
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  A second way to support self-enhancement/self-protection explanations is by 
constructing manipulations that are intended differentially to influence the self or another 
person (e.g., acquaintance, average peer). Motivational explanations are bolstered when 
the manipulation influences the self but not others. As a case in point, participants in one 
study were led to believe (on the basis of an ostensibly valid personality inventory) or 
were asked to imagine identical and negative social/performance feedback. Participants 
remembered the feedback more poorly when it pertained to the self (e.g., “I would often 
lie to my parents,” “I would make fun of others because of their looks”) than another 
person (“Chris would often lie to his parents,” “Chris would make fun of others because 
of their looks” (Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004).  
A third strategy refers to directing the manipulation at self-aspects that are either 
high or low in personal relevance (i.e., central vs. peripheral). Motivational explanations 
are supported when the manipulation influences central but not peripheral self-aspects. 
For example, negative social/performance feedback is remembered more poorly when it 
pertains to central self-aspects (e.g., untrustworthy, unkind) rather than peripheral self-
aspects (e.g., unpredictable, complaining; Green et al., 2008; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 
2004).  So, feedback of the form “An employer would not rely on you to have an 
important project completed by the deadline” and “You would purposely hurt someone to 
benefit yourself” is remembered poorly compared to feedback of the form “People cannot 
tell whether you are joking” and “You would get irritated and comment loudly if the 
weather was bad.” 
  A fourth way to support self-enhancement/self-protection explanations is to 
demonstrate differences between groups of people whose personal characteristics suggest 
that they should have varying motivations for self-enhancement or protection. The most 
prominent studies of this type involve differences between people who score relatively 
high or low on global self-esteem measures. Research has shown, for example, that low 
self-esteem people self-handicap in order to reduce the implications of failure, whereas 
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high self-esteem people self-handicap in order to enhance the implications of success 
(Tice, 1991). In addition, compared to their high self-esteem counterparts, low self-
esteem people are less prone to define their traits self-servingly (Beauregard & Dunning, 
2001) and less likely to use their own attributes as a basis for evaluating others (Dunning 
& Beauregard, 2000). 
  Various forms of logic provide a fifth means of supporting self-enhancement/self-
protection interpretations. For example, if workers on a collaborative project each claim 
to do more than their share, then it is safe to assume that one of them has miscalculated, 
although legwork would still be required to tie this misperception to self-enhancement or 
self-protection motives (Ross & Sicoly, 1979). The better-than-average effect 
demonstrates similar logic in that investigators can safely assume that, for a given trait, 
90% of a population is not really in the top 10% of that population, barring a severely 
skewed distribution. 
  Finally, the most direct way to demonstrate a self-enhancement or self-protection 
bias is to refer a person’s actions or attributions to an objective standard. A recent study 
illustrates this tack (Preuss & Alicke, 2008). In one experiment, actors were led to believe 
that they were making dating videotapes that would be viewed and evaluated by their 
peers. On these tapes, they described their goals and aspirations, hobbies, and attitudes. 
After making the videotape, actors watched the tapes that six others had made. Actors 
then ranked themselves and the six other persons both in terms of their overall dating 
attractiveness and on a series of personality characteristics. At the same time, observers 
(i.e., people who did not make any video presentations) watched and ranked the same 
block of seven presentations. Actors and observers also predicted where they thought the 
actor would be ranked among the six other persons by a group of opposite-sex peers who 
viewed the presentations (metaperceptions). To assess accuracy, actors’ self-rankings and 
metaperceptions were compared to the ranks given to them by observers. The results 
were clear: Participants were consistently overly-optimistic not only in their self-
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rankings, but also in their projections of how they would be viewed by others. In general, 
actors overestimated their dating popularity by about one full rank both in terms of their 
self rankings and their metaperceptions (i.e., their estimate of the rank that others would 
give them). Descriptive analysis showed that, on both self-rankings and metaperceptions, 
60% of the actors were self-enhancers (i.e., ranked themselves higher than did yoked 
observers), 25% were self-diminishers, and 15% provided rankings that were identical to 
those provided by observers. These findings show, therefore, that actors are generally 
miscalibrated (compared to observers’ opinions) in the direction of self-enhancement 
when it comes evaluating an important characteristic (dating popularity), and that they 
self-enhance even when strong reality constraints are present—that is, when they run the 
risk of their self-evaluations being directly contradicted by objective data. 
Addressing Alternative Explanations 
  Each of the aforementioned methods for supporting self-enhancement/self-
protection explanations can, of course, be counterposed by non-motivational alternatives. 
Four types of alternatives loom most prominently: expectancies, self-presentational 
concerns, differential memory, and egocentrism.  
  Expectancies. All experimentally-manipulated feedback occurs against the 
background of existing self-knowledge. This self-knowledge varies in the directness with 
which it relates to the experimental manipulation. For example, participants who are 
informed that they are physically weak or unattractive, slow-witted, or socially inept, 
may have prior evidence to support or contradict this feedback. Researchers, therefore, 
often explain to participants that the task measures a novel characteristic in order to 
minimize the influence of prior knowledge. Nevertheless, participants may still view the 
feedback in terms of their perceived global standing on the evaluative dimension. In other 
words, while they may harbour only weak expectations regarding how socially sensitive 
they are as measured by this specific test, they still have a general sense of their standing 
on this trait—a standing that is incorporated into their self-evaluation.  
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  Given that there is no way to eliminate global expectations, it is impossible 
completely to circumvent this potential quandary. However, expectancies only 
occasionally pose significant problems. In fact, given that most people have 
comparatively positive self-views, the fact that negative feedback manipulations are so 
frequently successful suggests that expectancies are usually surmountable. And of course, 
evidence for self-enhancement and self-protection have been obtained in numerous 
studies that do not provide task-related feedback and, therefore, that do not entail 
expectancy issues. Finally, expectancies do not account for the data (but self-
enhancement/self-protection explanations do), when expectancies are experimentally 
controlled or manipulated (Alicke et al., 2001; Sedikides & Green, 2004). 
Self-Presentation. The possibility sometimes arises that self-enhancement and 
self-protection efforts are geared primarily to save face in public situations. Self-
presentational alternatives first rose to prominence in the early phases of self-serving bias 
research. According to these views, the tendencies to take undue credit for positive events 
and to minimize one’s role in negative events occur primarily to impress or save face 
before evaluative audiences. Such machinations reflect a different type of self-
enhancement or self-protection, namely, a concern with regulating public impressions 
rather than enhancing or protecting self-images. In response, self-enhancement/self-
protection proponents were able to show that these effects persevere in highly private 
response conditions (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982), thereby establishing 
that self-presentation could not completely explain the self-serving bias. Demonstrating 
effects in private response conditions has become a common feature of self-
enhancement/self-protection experiments that wish to minimize self-presentational 
concerns (Sedikides, 1993).  
Memory. Differential memory accounts of self-enhancement/self-protection 
phenomena are usually applied to comparative judgements in which participants compare 
their characteristics or prospects with those of other peers or groups, or with hypothetical 
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entities such as an average peer. For example, Weinstein’s (1980, 1984) original 
explanation for the optimistic bias—the tendency to view one’s life prospects more 
favourably than those of others—was that people selectively recall their own strengths or 
others’ weaknesses. Similar accounts have been applied to self-serving attributional 
tendencies. When people accord themselves more credit than they deserve for positive 
outcomes, or overestimate their contributions to collaborative efforts, a compelling 
explanation for these attributions is that their own positive actions, attributes, and efforts 
are more easily brought to mind. 
Of course, this immediately raises the question to a self-enhancement adherent as 
to why positively-biased memories are so readily available; indeed, as diary studies have 
demonstrated, people remember positive life events better than negative life events 
(Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, & Shannon, 1991; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 
2003), and, relatedly, affect associated with positive life events dissipates at a slower rate 
than affect associated with negative life events (Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Walker, 
2004; Walker et al., 2003) . It seems plausible to assume that the desire to view oneself 
favourably could result in positive information receiving a privileged place in memory. 
This is precisely the type of thorny issue that sometimes makes it difficult to choose 
between motivational and non-motivational explanations of specific experimental 
findings (Greenwald, 1975; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). We will return to this issue 
momentarily. For now, however, it is important to note two points. First, research on self-
enhancement and self-protection has moved far beyond its roots in the self-serving bias; 
our previous discussion of the role of expectancies speaks to this issue. Second, 
differential memory fails to provide a plausible alternative for many instances of social 
protection; we have presented research, for example, showing that self-protection is 
observed even when controlling for information or feedback availability (Sedikides & 
Green, 2000, 2004).  
Egocentrism. Piaget (1929) introduced egocentrism into the psychology 
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vernacular to refer to children’s inability during the preoperational stage of development 
to adopt the perspective of others, a tendency that is not completely relinquished in 
adulthood (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). Egocentrism should not be 
confused with egoism: Whereas egoism refers to self-enhancement that purposefully 
fosters positive self-feelings or self-beliefs, egocentrism is the tendency to use one’s own 
experiences, attributes, or expectations as a basis for evaluating others (Gilovich, 
Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000; Kruger, Epley, Parker, & Ng, 2005). Thus, whereas egoism is 
clearly motivational, egocentrism results from the fact that one’s own experiences are 
hyper-accessible. 
Egocentrism has been a frequent explanation for social comparison effects that 
require people to evaluate their characteristics and outcomes versus those of their peers. 
Among the findings to which egocentrism explanations have been applied are that self 
judgements account for more of the variance in self versus average peer comparative 
judgements than do judgements of the average peer (Klar & Giladi, 1999), that people 
rate themselves below average in behavioural domains in which they know they fare 
poorly (presumably because they ruminate disproportionately about their own 
shortcomings; Kruger, 1999), and that people are unduly pessimistic about their chances 
in competitions when obstacles are introduced (such as task difficulty) that would impede 
everyone’s performance (again, because they concentrate disproportionately on how the 
adversity would affect them; Moore & Kim, 2003; Windshitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003). 
Egocentrism is undoubtedly a critical component of many social judgement 
phenomena, as is focalism (the tendency to overweight information that is in focal 
attention rather than the background; Pahl & Eiser, 2006, 2007). However, in most of the 
studies in which egocentrism and focalism  are posed as alternatives to motivational 
phenomena, the manipulations reduce self-enhancement effects but do not eliminate 
them. And, while it is demonstrably true that people place undue emphasis on their own 
experiences, values, and attributes in comparative judgements, it is entirely possible that 
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they sometimes do this to promote their own positive characteristics (Dunning, 2002; 
Sedikides, 2003). Nevertheless, self-enhancement and self-protection are minimized (but 
often not eliminated) when the judgement domain is highly objective and verifiable, very 
difficult, or very rare (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Dauenheimer et al., 2002; Burson, 
Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Kruger & Burrus, 2004), when people are induced to think 
carefully about their own shortcomings or the obstacles that may obviate success 
(Sedikides, & Herbst, 2002; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002; Sedikides et al., 
2007), and when people work jointly with close others on interdependent-outcome task 
(Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998). 
Hopeless Ambiguity? 
  In 1919, a team of English scientists led by Arthur Eddington of the Cambridge 
Observatory went on an expedition to observe an eclipse that would provide a critical test 
of Albert Einstein’s general relativity theory and perhaps supplant the long-held 
cosmology of their own beloved Isaac Newton. In response to Einstein’s casual receipt of 
the information that his theory had been corroborated, a graduate student asked what he 
would have done if the data had contradicted his theory. Einstein calmly replied: “Then I 
would have been sorry for the dear Lord; the theory is correct” (Isaacson, 2007, p. 259). 
  Einstein’s comment bespeaks the less dramatic truth that single experiments 
rarely establish or overturn prevailing theoretical perspectives (Lakatos, 1970). How 
could one, for example, design an experiment to show unequivocally that high self-
esteem protects against existential anxiety, that people evaluate themselves more 
favourably than others in order to maintain positive self-views, or that making excuses 
for poor performance forestalls self-concept decline? Support for broad theoretical 
assumptions, such as whether self-enhancement and self-protection motives contribute 
significantly to personal identity, social judgement, and intergroup behaviour, depend on 
the outcomes of whole research programs rather than individual experiments.  
The self-perception versus cognitive dissonance debate that launched the 
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motivation-cognition distinction exemplifies the difficulty of providing conclusive 
evidence from a single or a small set of studies. Bem’s self-perception theory is capable 
of explaining the acquisition of many self-knowledge components, including knowledge 
of intentions, goals, interpersonal characteristics, and behavioural traits (Alicke, 1987). 
On the other hand, even some of cognitive dissonance theory’s strongest adherents have 
advocated delimiting its scope (Cooper & Fazio, 1984). So here’s the rub: All 
motivational accounts are accompanied by cognitive mechanisms that explain how these 
motives are realized in action and judgement (Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990), and these 
cognitive mechanisms, which include expectancies, selective memory, and a host of 
judgement biases, are often well-established phenomena with wide applicability. Thus, 
virtually every self-enhancement or self-protection explanation coexists with one or more 
pervasive non-motivational mechanisms, and it is incumbent on self-theorists to show 
what self-enhancement/self-protection assumptions can add to these already powerful and 
compelling explanatory factors.  
  The illusion of control provides another example of the difficulties that 
researchers confront in carving out a self-enhancement/self-protection niche against the 
background of a robust non-motivational phenomenon. The general tendency to 
exaggerate control is well-established and is often exhibited in circumstances that seem 
unrelated to self-enhancement or self-protection. For example, it is difficult to imagine 
how self-enhancement is served by paying four times as much money to repurchase a 
personally-chosen lottery ticket versus one that someone else selected (Langer & Roth, 
1975). On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that overestimating one’s control 
over random events serves sometimes to enhance self-efficacy beliefs (i.e, self-
enhancement) or to deflect thoughts of being victimized by such events (i.e., self-
protection). The just-world hypothesis, for example, assumes that holding faultless 
victims responsible for their fates maintains the illusion that the world is an equitable 
place where rewards and costs are distributed in proportion to good and bad deeds. 
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Although many studies support the just-world hypothesis, the specific motive it posits— 
the desire to view the world as just—is difficult to pinpoint empirically. Most studies on 
this topic are consistent with the non-motivational assumption that certain conditions 
exacerbate the tendency to overestimate how much control victims exerted (Lerner & 
Miller, 1978; Miller, 2001). 
  Ultimately, the strength of any scientific hypothesis derives from the weight of 
evidence from studies designed to demonstrate the validity of its assumptions, and by the 
diversity of findings that support it. With regard to individual studies, the trick is to hold 
constant other motives or other non-motivational variables while varying factors designed 
to increase or decrease self-enhancement/self-protection tendencies. The health and vigor 
of self-enhancement/self-protection hypotheses derives in part from the numerous studies 
that have convincingly isolated these motives from alternative interpretations (Alicke & 
Govorun, 2005; Alicke et al., 2001; Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & Green, 2004). No 
single one of these studies provides evidence that a determined and clever naysayer 
cannot contradict. At this point, however, a preponderance of the evidence clearly 
establishes self-enhancement and self-protection as vital to explaining how people 
construct their identities, maintain them, and evaluate other people. 
Integrative Explanations 
  In concluding this section, we want to emphasize again that either/or explanations 
are not the answer to the hoary cognition-motivation debate. Self-enhancement and self-
protection processes, especially the type that can be manipulated ethically in a laboratory 
setting, generally occur against the background of powerful perceptual and information-
processing forces that can account for many aspects of the phenomenon under 
investigation. As we have noted previously, for example, egocentrism—a non-
motivational factor—is an important contributor to frequently demonstrated phenomena 
such as the better-than-average effect and the optimistic bias. Self-enhancement is only 
one explanatory mechanism that contributes to such effects. To take another research 
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example, consider the phenomenon of belief perseverance—the tendency to adhere to 
beliefs that have been objectively invalidated (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). Belief 
perseverance is a robust phenomenon, having been demonstrated in a variety of settings. 
However, almost all of these studies examine the perseverance of beliefs that are largely 
irrelevant to the judges’ self-concept. From a self-enhancement or self-protection 
standpoint, it seems odd that a person would perseverate on a negative self-belief, 
especially one that was objectively invalidated. Accordingly, recent research (Guenther & 
Alicke, 2008) has shown that, when participants receive negative feedback about their 
performance on a task that is said to measure an important intellectual trait, and are 
subsequently told that this feedback was mistaken, they perseverate on it significantly 
less than do observers who are simply aware of the feedback. Nevertheless, some degree 
of perseverance on the negative characteristic remains, showing that perseverance is 
indeed a viable phenomenon, and that self-protection interests are only partially able to 
surmount this tendency. 
Does It Really Matter? 
  Even when the weight of the evidence supports a purposive self-
enhancement/self-protection interpretation, the question remains as to what such 
explanations afford. In other words, is it really worth all the trouble to establish this type 
of motivational explanation? In our view, there are four related reasons why such 
explanations are important. 
The first reason is an obvious one; namely, to advance effective covering laws 
that govern a wide range of cases. To illustrate, we return to the example of self-serving 
attributional biases. In essence, these biases involve exaggerating the favourable 
dispositional implications of positive outcomes and minimizing the impact of negative 
ones. If this occurs because people wish to feel good about themselves, then researchers 
can anticipate the instigation of these motives and predict their effects. Simply put, these 
biases should emerge when conditions favour the need for self-enhancement or self-
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protection and should recede when these needs are diminished (Campbell & Sedikides, 
1999). Thus, it should be possible to predict the types of actions and self-evaluations that 
occur under various conditions, and many studies have been designed for precisely these 
purposes (Mezulis et al., 2004; Shepperd, Malone, & Sweeny, 2008). 
  Another reason for pursuing self-enhancement/self-protection explanations is to 
supplement other explanatory factors that do not provide a complete account of self-
related phenomena. The reinterpretation of cognitive dissonance effects by Aronson and 
colleagues (Aronson et al., 1991) is an illustrative example. These investigators have 
transported cognitive dissonance into the self-enhancement/self-protection arena by 
assuming that dissonance reduction is a type of rationalization that helps people to avoid 
perceiving themselves as hypocritical. Festinger (1957), of course, conceptualized 
dissonance in terms of the drive reduction theories that were prevalent in the 1950s, 
particularly Hull’s (1943). For Festinger, aligning attitudes with behaviours served 
simply to reduce a tension state, analogous to the reduction of physiological tension. But 
the perspective of Aronson and colleagues has the advantage of redressing a question that 
Festinger’s formulation ignores, namely: Why would inconsistency produce tension in 
the first place? Aronson and colleagues make the reasonable assumption that 
inconsistency, especially between values and behaviours, has potentially negative 
consequences for the self. The point, then, is to show that attitude change occurs when 
these negative consequences are present, and is reduced or eradicated when they are 
absent—an effect that Aronson and his colleagues have demonstrated in a series of 
studies (Aronson et al., 1991; Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, 
& Fried, 1994). 
  The third reason for invoking self-enhancement/self-protection explanations is 
that such explanations elucidate behaviours that would otherwise appear puzzling and 
paradoxical. Such behaviours include setting out to perform badly (Baumeister, Cooper, 
& Skib, 1979), creating impediments to one’s success (Berglas & Jones, 1978), 
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procrastination (Tice & Baumeister, 1997), failure to comply with medical advice (Sacket 
& Snow, 1979), misguided perseverance (Brockner, Rubin, & Lang, 1981), revenge that 
is costly to the self (Brown, 1968), and various health risks such as substance abuse, 
engaging in unprotected sex, sunbathing excessively, failing to exercise, and dieting 
(Leary, Tchividjian, & Kraxberger, 1994). In all of these cases, the motives to enhance or 
protect the self provide cogent explanations. 
The final, more encompassing, reason for pursing motivational self-
enhancement/self-protection explanations is that psychology, as the science of thought, 
behaviour, and emotion, naturally desires to convey an accurate and comprehensive 
depiction of its subject matter. Although non-human behaviour can be explained without 
reference to self-enhancement/self-protection, such concepts are indispensable for 
explaining the antecedents of human functioning and the psychological processes that 
underlie behavioural decisions and explanations. Human brains permit not only advanced 
problem-solving, verbal representation and projection into the future, but they also confer 
the capacity for self-evaluation (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997, 2003; Sedikides, 
Skowronski, & Dunbar, 2006). Whereas good and bad feelings in other animals pertain to 
appetitive needs and freedom from harm, humans have a fundamental need for 
belongingness and social acceptance (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Knowles & 
Gardner, 2008; Leary & Cox, 2007) that leads them to assess whether the impressions 
they convey are likely to lead to social acceptance or rejection. Furthermore, as terror 
management theorists have emphasized, humans are aware that their lives are finite, and 
this recognition spurs many of their actions and judgements, including self- and social-
evaluations (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). 
Epilogue 
In his best-selling compendium on the works of Shakespeare, the literary critic, 
Harold Bloom, makes the sweeping claim that Shakespeare invented the human being 
(1998). Bloom does not mean to say that Shakespeare was the first to note that people 
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have expectancies, memories, or that they contrast and assimilate information from a 
standard. What he means is that Shakespeare, more than any writer before and perhaps 
since, depicted the ego strivings, self-delusions, passions, and illusions that engender the 
great tragedies and joys of human experience. In fact, the Western literary canon, from 
Homer to the present, is a long description of these common themes that pervade the 
human condition. 
Social and personality psychologists, following an academic tradition from the 
pre-Socratics to the existentialists of the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, have also 
pursued these themes throughout their history. And now, research on the self-
enhancement and self-protection motives stands exactly where Aristippus, Epicurus, 
Hobbes, and Bentham would like it to stand: At the center of psychological explanations 
of self-identity and social attribution. These motives have been invoked as key factors in 
accounting for the ways in which people view and appraise themselves, their social 
world, their close others, and their groups. Self-definition and social attribution are 
complex, multiply-determined processes, and the motives to view oneself favourably, or 
to avoid viewing oneself unfavourably, are central to a thorough understanding of their 
operation. 
In this article, we have defined the motives, delineated their scope, discussed their 
interrelation, and elaborated on their functionality. In addition, we raised epistemic issues 
such as what qualifies as a motivational explanation and whether such an explanation 
matters. We hope that our treatment of the self-enhancement and self-protection motives 
will clarify their use and interpretation and will further invigorate an already thriving area 
of research. 
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Figure 1: A Hypothetical Network of Interests  
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Figure 2: An Example of Basketball Skill with Aspiration Level, Perceived Level, Objective 
Level, and Tolerance 
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